More Than an Assertion: How United States v. Pulungan
Nudged the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Toward
Increased Transparency*

I. Introduction
The defense and aviation industries play a significant role in Oklahoma’s
economy. In the last three years alone, at least $155 million in defense
contracts have been awarded to Oklahoma-based companies, signaling an
increase in defense research and development in the state.1 According to
the Oklahoma Department of Commerce, aerospace-related companies
accounted for 6.2% of Oklahoma’s exports in 2010.2 Notably, Oklahoma’s
total exports grew more than 20% between 2006 and 2010.3 Defense
contractors and aerospace-related companies generally provide services,
aircrafts, equipment or other defense items to purchasers. Before these
companies can sell their items or services internationally or expose their
technology to many foreign nationals, they must obtain a license from one
of several executive agencies.4
The U.S. system of export controls prohibits or limits the export of items
or services that could detrimentally affect national security or U.S. foreign
* The author wishes to thank Michael Scaperlanda, Professor of Law at the University of
Oklahoma College of Law, and Gretta Rowold, Executive Director of Secure Research
Operations at the University of Oklahoma, for their advice and encouragement during the
writing of this note.
1. In 2009, the U.S. Marines awarded an Oklahoma-based defense contractor a $61 million
contract to manufacture tactical vehicle trailers. See Choctaw Manufacturing Development
Corporation, OKLA. DEP’T OF COM. (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.okcommerce.gov/
Commerce/About/rc/Choctaw-Manufacturing-Development-corporation-Awarded-$61-MillionDefense-Contract. In 2010, a university research branch in Oklahoma was awarded a $44 million
contract from the U.S. Navy to develop unmanned aerial vehicle technology. See OSU Receives
$44 Million Contract for Unmanned Aerial Systems, OKLA. STATE UNIV. (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://news.okstate.edu/index.php/press-releases/511-osu-receives-44-million-contract-for-unman
ned-aerial-systems. Moreover in 2011, the U.S. Air Force awarded an Oklahoma City-based
defense contractor a major subcontract worth up to $50 million to train personnel on the world’s
largest aircraft, the C-5 galaxy. See Jay F. Marks, City Business Lands Contract, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 26, 2011, at B1.
2. OKLA. DEP’T OF COM., 2010 OKLAHOMA EXPORT REPORT 7 (2011), available at
http://www.okcommerce.gov/Libraries/Documents/2010-Oklahoma-Exports-Overview-1_3263.pdf.
3. Id. at 6.
4. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009) (listing articles, services, and technical data
regulated by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls).
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policy.
Although these are legitimate concerns, exporters can be
unwittingly entangled in the system. Exporters navigating the numerous
regulations can have difficulty determining which agency to consult and
whether a license is required at all. Some exporters may not even know
that such regulations exist. Regardless, the U.S. export control system
expects industry insiders to comprehend and adhere to applicable
regulations.
In August 2010, President Obama introduced the groundwork for
sweeping changes in the U.S. export control system, intending to reinforce
national security while increasing U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing
and technology.5 The changes came in the wake of an interagency review
that recognized the disparate approaches of the primary export licensing
agencies.6 The review noted jurisdictional disputes between regulatory
agencies arising from an inconsistency and lack of transparency in agency
decisions.7
As part of the changes, the President introduced a new webpage to aid
exporters in navigating export controls and planning international sales.8
The changes also included a proposed revision of Category VII of the
United States Munitions List (Munitions List), the list of defense articles
and services governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR).9 This revision is the first attempt at transforming the categorical
Munitions List to a “positive” list.10
Presently, the Munitions List includes twenty-one broad categories with
subjective criteria—making it difficult to ascertain whether an item fits a
category.11 A positive list will apply new objective criteria and provide

5. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Lays the Foundation for
a New Export Control System to Strengthen National Security and the Competitiveness of
Key U.S. Manufacturing and Technology Sectors (Aug. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/30/president-obama-lays-foundation-anew-export-control-system-strengthen-n.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces First Steps
toward Implementation of New U.S. Export Control System (Dec. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/president-obama-announces-firststeps-toward-implementation-new-us-expor [hereinafter December Press Release].
9. Id.; see also Revisions to United States Munitions List, 75 Fed. Reg. 76935 (Dec. 10,
2010) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. § 121.1).
10. December Press Release, supra note 8.
11. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2009); December Press Release, supra note 8.
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clarity to exporters.12 By revising the Munitions List into a positive list of
items and services that fit published criteria, thereby helping exporters
decide more easily if an item is controlled, the executive branch hopes to
eliminate jurisdictional disputes between agencies.13
These changes may also reduce the number of executive agency
decisions subject to judicial review. The most divisive issues surrounding
arms export violations include the lack of procedural safeguards in the
regulations and judicial review of agency designations of defense items.
The regulations, even with the reforms, create the possibility of
unintentional criminal violations. Newcomers to international trade,
especially from smaller companies, are likely unaware of the federal
licensing requirements. Although the government must show that an
exporter willfully violated the regulations,14 what constitutes a “willful”
violation of the regulations remains widely debated. The present circuit
split15 regarding procedural safeguards and judicial review of defense item
designations necessitates either amended legislation or guidance from the
Supreme Court.
This note examines United States v. Pulungan, a recent appellate court
decision involving the Munitions List.16 This decision revealed a definite
reluctance by the Seventh Circuit to favor broad regulatory power free from
judicial review when the executive agency decision lacked transparency—
subjecting exporters to the whims of an unchecked, unelected agency. This
note focuses on understanding the regulation of defense articles and
services by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). Part II
summarizes the legislative history of export controls and case law prior to
the Seventh Circuit decision. Part III discusses the facts and issues
addressed in United States v. Pulungan. Part IV presents the holding and
Part V analyzes how the decision appropriately increased pressure on the
DDTC to operate with more transparency and how the court correctly

12. December Press Release, supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2010).
15. Compare United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Murphy, 852 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988); and United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826
(9th Cir. 1976) (applying a broad interpretation of “willfully”), with United States v. Smith,
918 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Adames, 878 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1989); and
United States v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying a narrow interpretation
of “willfully”).
16. United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2009).

842

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:839

exercised judicial review and applied a narrow definition of willfulness.
This note concludes with Part VI.
II. The History of Export Controls
A. An Explanation of Present Regulatory Agency Roles
An exploration of export controls unavoidably begins with decoding the
barrage of acronyms governing the trade of items that could detrimentally
affect U.S. foreign policy or national security. The responsibility for
implementing export controls is dispersed among several administrative
agencies. These agencies decide whether an item may be exported, where
the item may be exported, and who may receive the item.
Within the United States Department of State, the DDTC regulates the
export of defense articles and services that have primarily military
purposes.17 The DDTC governs the export and temporary import of these
defense items through the ITAR.18 These regulations contain the presently
categorical list of export-controlled defense items that constitute the
Munitions List.19
Within the United States Department of Commerce, the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) regulates the export of commercial items and
“dual use” technologies and products through the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR).20 “Dual use” items are those “that have both
commercial and military or proliferation applications,” such that the trade
of these items prompts national security concerns.21 The primary list of the
items regulated by the EAR is the Commerce Control List (CCL),22 which
is more objective and positive than the Munitions List.
Within the United States Department of Treasury, the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) enforces national sanctions against other countries
and monitors trade restrictions on suspected criminals.23 Unlike the DDTC
17. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2009).
18. Id. §§ 120-130. DDTC only has authority over temporary imports, which are by
definition “exports” because they will leave the country at some point. See id. § 120.18.
Permanent imports are under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives. See 27 C.F.R. § 447.1 (2010).
19. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2010). As part of the changes
to the export control system, the DDTC is revising this list into a positive list. See
December Press Release, supra note 8.
20. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(a) (2011).
21. Id. § 772.1.
22. Id. § 774.1.
23. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.
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and BIS, OFAC generally focuses on the geographical destination of an
item rather than the nature of the item itself. For instance, OFAC has
imposed comprehensive sanctions upon Burma, Cuba, Iran, and Sudan.24
The DDTC, BIS, and OFAC comprise only a portion of the alphabet
soup of agencies that govern foreign trade.
Unsurprisingly, both
experienced exporters and novices encounter great difficulty navigating the
complex maze of lists and regulations these agencies create.
B. The History and Purpose of the AECA
In 1976, Congress passed the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which
granted the president authority to control the trade and licensing of
defense articles and services.25 President Ford delegated this authority to
the U.S. Department of State.26 Through this delegation, the DDTC is
authorized to designate which items constitute the Munitions List, the list
of defense items subject to export regulations.27 A defense item is an
article or service without a predominantly civilian application that “[i]s
specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a
military application . . . .”28
Importantly, the Munitions List specifies twenty-one categories of items
rather than a list of each individual item subject to control.29 The DDTC
determines the published categories and designates whether a specific item
falls within a category.30 An item designated on the Munitions List may not
be exported or temporarily imported without a license from the DDTC.31
Any person who willfully exports designated defense items without a
license violates these regulations and may be subject to a fine up to
$1,000,000 and up to twenty years’ imprisonment.32 The DDTC’s power to
publish categories without judicial review is uncontested, but whether the
designation of an item as fitting a category is subject to judicial review
remains open for debate.
treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/index.shtml (last accessed Jan. 15, 2011).
24. Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#9 (last accessed Mar. 29,
2011).
25. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2010).
26. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 18, 1977).
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1).
28. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3(a) (2010).
29. See id. § 121.1.
30. See id. § 121.1(a); see also infra Part II.C.
31. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2).
32. Id. § 2778(c).
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Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Munitions List designations is
the DDTC’s claimed freedom from judicial review and rule-making
procedures. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which outlines
procedures for rule-making by executive agencies, applies to agency
decisions unless the regulations involve “a military or foreign affairs
function of the United States” or another expressed exception.33 The
AECA does not expressly state that the designation of an item is a foreign
affairs function exception to the APA, but it does expressly exclude
published regulations from judicial review.34 The AECA declares, “[t]he
designation by the President (or by an official to whom the President’s
functions . . . have been duly delegated), in regulations issued under this
section, of items as defense articles or defense services for purposes of this
section shall not be subject to judicial review.”35 The DDTC asserts that
the AECA involves a foreign affairs function because it permits the agency
to monitor trade of defense items with the purpose of furthering world
peace and security.36 Consequently, the DDTC considers the designation of
a particular item to a Munitions List category as exempt from APA rulemaking procedures and judicial review.37 As this note will discuss, some
circuit courts interpret the AECA as allowing judicial review of
unpublished Munitions List designations.
What exactly constitutes a foreign affairs function exemption from the
APA is not fully defined in legislative history. In 1947, one year after
President Truman signed the APA into law, the Attorney General released a
manual to aid government agencies and the general public in interpreting
the APA.38 The Attorney General construed the exemption as applying to
most actions of the State Department.39 The manual referenced Senate and
House Reports that declined exempting all overseas functions, and instead
limited the exemption to “those ‘affairs’ which so affect relations with other
governments that, for example, public rule making provisions would clearly
provoke definitely undesirable international consequences.”40 Using this
33. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2010).
34. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778.
35. Id. § 2778(h) (emphasis added).
36. 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2010).
37. Id.
38. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/
references/reference_works/agtc.htm.
39. Id. at 27.
40. Id. at 26 (quoting S. REP. NO. 752, at 13 (1946), and H.R. REP. NO. 1980, at 23
(1946)).
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interpretation, if requiring the DDTC to conform to the APA rule-making
procedures would provoke undesirable international consequences, then
creating Munitions List categories is exempt from judicial review as a
foreign affairs function.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the definition of a foreign affairs
function or whether implementing the ITAR is a foreign affairs function
exempt from APA rule-making procedures. The United States Court of
International Trade (CIT) has addressed this issue. According to the CIT,
judges must narrowly construe whether the regulations “clearly and
directly” entail a “foreign affairs function.”41 To determine a foreign affairs
function exemption, the CIT examines the function of an agency regulation,
not the document granting the agency authority.42 Under this approach, the
function of the ITAR, not the authority granted by the AECA, determines
whether or not implementing the ITAR is exempt from the APA rulemaking procedures. The DDTC lists the function of the ITAR as executing
“[t]he statutory authority of the President to promulgate regulations with
respect to exports of defense articles and defense services . . . .”43
Regulating defense exports almost certainly entails a foreign affairs
function, but it remains debatable whether or not promulgating those
regulations through APA public rule-making provisions, such as advance
notice and an opportunity to comment,44 would have negative international
consequences.
C. Judicial Review of DDTC Designations
Only a few circuit courts have addressed whether Munitions List
designations are exempt from APA rule-making procedures and judicial
review. Most of the discussion arises within vagueness challenges to the
AECA.
In United States v. Zheng, the Third Circuit chose to defer to the DDTC
rather than review its decision to place an item on the Munitions List.45 The
defendants were charged with violating the ITAR by exporting wave tube
amplifiers to China without a license.46 The DDTC asserted that the
amplifiers fell under “active and passive countermeasures” within Category
41. Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 214, 231 (1984).
42. Id. at 230.
43. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2010).
44. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2010).
45. United States v. Zheng, 768 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 519. Wave tube amplifiers are a type of radar jamming device. See United
States v. Zheng, 590 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.C.N.J. 1984).
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XI of the Munitions List.47 The defendants argued that the broad category
created by the DDTC failed to satisfy the AECA requirement of designating
export-controlled “items.”48 The district court agreed with the defendants
and determined that “countermeasures” did not constitute “items.”49 The
district court reasoned that Congress meant “to obtain greater particularity
in the Munitions List so as to facilitate congressional oversight and
‘increase the quality of notice available to potential exporters.’”50 The
appellate court disagreed. Instead, the Third Circuit gave the DDTC wide
latitude in designating which items fell into the broad Munitions List
category.51 The court found that the DDTC’s assertion that wave amplifiers
were “countermeasures” was alone sufficient to make them subject to
licensing requirements.52
In United States v. Gregg, the Eighth Circuit also favored agency
discretion over judicial interference in export controls.53 A jury found the
appellant guilty of unlawfully exporting controlled items, including: night
vision goggles, military aircraft communication radios, components of a
missile system, and a tactical air navigational radio system.54 Gregg was
also convicted for exporting items on the CCL, which is governed by the
EAR.55 The appellant contended that both of the regulations, the ITAR and
EAR, were unconstitutionally vague.56 The Eighth Circuit recognized that
Congress granted the executive branch discretion to weigh policy objectives
for export controls.57 The court explained that even if the policy objectives
were vague, the government did not need to justify them.58 The
government only needed to prove that the items were on the Munitions List
and that the defendant possessed the requisite level of intent.59
The court cited a district court decision stressing that Congress “clearly
expressed its desire that the executive branch, not the courts, have the final

47. Zheng, 768 F.2d at 519.
48. Id. at 521.
49. Id. at 520.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 523.
52. Id. at 524.
53. United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. 1987).
54. Id. at 1433.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1437.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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word on which items should be restricted.”60 This district court decision,
however, discussed the congressional intent behind the Export
Administration Act of 1979, not the Arms Export Control Act.61 The
Eighth Circuit relied upon the former and extended the same congressional
intent to violations of the AECA without any legislative history to support
this extension.62
D. Proving Willfulness for a Criminal Violation of the AECA
Exempting Munitions List designations from the APA rule-making
procedures and judicial review has raised serious issues in proving the
requisite level of intent for AECA violations. Some courts have concluded
that vagueness arguments due to lack of notice are defeated by the specific
intent requirement of AECA.63 For instance, in United States v. Hsu, the
Fourth Circuit found that the AECA was not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to the defendants.64 In this case, the defendants were convicted for
conspiring and attempting to unlawfully export military encryption devices
to China.65 The question on appeal was whether the defendants “in fact had
fair notice that the statute and regulations proscribed their conduct.”66 The
defendants argued that the Munitions List was unconstitutionally vague as
applied to them because it did not clarify that the specific devices they
attempted to export qualified as “military” devices.67 The court stressed that
the AECA’s requirement of willfulness counteracts most as-applied
vagueness challenges to the AECA because the requirement that a
defendant must willfully violate the regulations protects the innocent
exporter who unknowingly exports a controlled item.68 Here, the
defendants were repeatedly told beforehand that they needed a license to
export in order to avoid illegal activity; therefore, they lost their vagueness
challenge because the government proved willfulness.69
The mens rea for a criminal violation of the AECA is not absolutely
clear. The law states that “[a]ny person who willfully violates any
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550, 553 (D. Mass.
1983)).
61. See Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. at 553.
62. See Gregg, 829 F.2d at 1437.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2004).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 196.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 197.
69. Id. at 198.
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provision” of the AECA is subject to criminal prosecution.70 The circuit
courts, however, have not agreed upon a consistent interpretation of
“willfully.”
The most detailed Supreme Court discussion of the definition of
“willfully” is in Bryan v. United States. This case interpreted a different,
but analogous, federal statute.71 The petitioner illegally dealt in firearms
without a license.72 The Court determined that within the federal weapons
licensing statute, “willfully” only required knowledge of unlawful conduct
and did not allow an exception for ignorance of the law.73 The Court
acknowledged that certain regulations are so complicated that they risk
“ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” yet the
Court did not see the risk of ensnaring individuals by requiring a weapons
license.74 The Court noted, however, that ignorance of the law may be a
defense when apparently innocent activity is governed by highly technical
statutes.75
Justice Scalia objected to the generality of the majority opinion in Bryan.
In his dissent, he expressed concern “that the defendant must be ignorant of
every law violated . . . to be innocent of willfully violating the licensing
requirement.”76 If “willfully” only requires knowledge that conduct is
unlawful, knowledge of any unlawful conduct, even conduct not addressed
by the statute, could result in a criminal conviction under an ambiguous
statute.77 Justice Scalia’s dissent articulated the dangers and frustrations
resulting from a broad definition of “willfully.”78
In cases involving the AECA, the government generally argues for a
broad definition of “willfully” on the grounds that the AECA does not
present a danger of ensnaring innocent individuals. On the other hand,
alleged violators argue that this danger is present because the categorical
Munitions List remains too broad to put exporters on notice that their
specific items might be subject to licensing requirements. They argue that
without objective criteria for what constitutes a defense item, the
regulations risk ensnaring innocent individuals. They promote the creation
70. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2010).
71. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
72. Dealing in firearms without a license is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)
(1996).
73. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 196.
74. Id. at 194.
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 202.
78. Id.
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of a positive list, rather than the current categorical list. Apparently, the
present administration has finally reacted.79
Several federal circuit court cases have followed the majority’s reasoning
in Bryan, but some circuits have heeded the concerns Justice Scalia
expressed in his dissent. As discussed below, similarly to Bryan, the First,
Third, and Ninth Circuits use a broad definition of “willfully.” The Second,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits apply a narrower definition. Prior to its
decision in Pulungan, the Seventh Circuit applied the broad definition in
United States v. Beck.80 There, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the need to
show knowledge of the licensing requirement, but required proof “that the
defendant was aware of a legal duty not to export the articles.”81
1. Federal Circuits Applying a Broad Definition of “Willfully”
In United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
willfulness requirement for a violation of 22 U.S.C. § 1934, the predecessor
to the AECA.82 The defendant was found guilty of illegally attempting to
export ammunition to Mexico, but the jury was given a general intent
instruction.83 On appeal, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a
specific intent jury instruction.84 The Ninth Circuit required the specific
intent instruction, and interpreted “willfully” as requiring proof of “a
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty not to export the
proscribed articles.”85 This decision paved the way for courts to apply a
broad definition of “willfully” when interpreting the AECA.
The First Circuit upheld a conviction of conspiracy to export firearms
without a license in United States v. Murphy.86 The defendants argued that
“willfully” meant the government must prove that defendants knew of the
licensing requirement and knew the items were on the Munitions List.87
Citing Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the court required proof of specific intent.88
The only evidence offered to show that the firearms were on the Munitions
List was testimony from a DDTC official asserting that they fit a category
79. See December Press Release, supra note 8.
80. See United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 1980).
81. Id.
82. See United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 827.
84. Id. at 828.
85. Id. at 829; see also United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1988).
86. See Murphy, 852 F.2d at 2.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 7.
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and required a license for export to Ireland.89 Nevertheless, the court ruled
against the defendant and interpreted “willfully” as requiring the
government to prove only that the defendant “knew he had a legal duty not
to export the weapons.”90 The court did not require proof that the defendant
knew about the ITAR or that the items were on the Munitions List.91
In United States v. Tsai, the Third Circuit affirmed the defendant’s
conviction for violating the AECA by exporting components of military
equipment to Taiwan without a license.92 The components were infrared
domes that function as a windshield for military missiles.93 The
government offered testimony from a missile system developer, testimony
from an advisor to the President on missile systems, and the certification of
the State Department to prove that the infrared domes required a license for
export.94 The defendant claimed he did not think that the domes required a
license for export because they could be used on helicopters rather than
missile systems.95 He argued the evidence was insufficient to prove the
domes fit Category IV(h) of the Munitions List, which requires a license for
components and parts of guided missile systems.96 The Third Circuit
rejected the defendant’s argument that the government must prove the
defendant knew about the license requirement.97 The court determined that
the defendant could be found guilty if he “knew that the export was
illegal.”98
2. Federal Circuits Applying a Narrow Definition of “Willfully”
Other federal circuit courts require something more than mere violation
of a known legal duty. For instance, the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits seem to require that the defendant have at least some knowledge of
the applicable licensing requirements.99 These circuits apply a narrower
definition of “willfully.”
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1992).
93. Id. at 158.
94. Id. at 158-59.
95. Id. at 159.
96. Id. at 159-60.
97. See id. at 161.
98. Id. at 162.
99. See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Adames,
878 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring specific intent to violate the statute); United States
v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring specific intent when items are

2012]

NOTES

851

In United States v. Smith, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to
violate the AECA by illegally exporting helicopters to the Middle East.100
The Second Circuit upheld the conviction and approved jury instructions
requiring “that defendant must have known that the helicopters to be
exported were subject to the licensing requirements of the Arms Export
Control Act and that he intended to export them in a manner inconsistent
therewith.”101 Under this court’s rationale, mere knowledge that he was
doing something generally unlawful would prove insufficient to support an
AECA violation.
The Fifth Circuit not only requires something more than knowledge of
illegal activity, but also allows ignorance of the law as a defense.102 In
United States v. Hernandez, the court reversed two of the three AECA
convictions and explained, “While it is true that Hernandez’ concealment of
the weapons possibly supported a jury finding that he knew his conduct was
unlawful, . . . such a finding falls short of deciding that he knew he was
unlawfully exporting weapons on the Munitions List.”103 The court reversed
the decision because the lower court failed to instruct the jury on the
relevance of ignorance of the law.
In United States v. Adames, the Eleventh Circuit cited the broad Ninth
Circuit approach to elucidate the requirement of willfulness, but the court
required a higher level of proof to demonstrate an intentional violation of
the AECA.104 The court stated, “Though it reasonably could be inferred
from Adames’ suspicious conduct that she was aware of the generally
unlawful nature of her actions, that state of mind is insufficient to sustain a
finding of guilt under a statute requiring specific intent.”105 The Eleventh
Circuit cited cases supporting the broad interpretation, but the court actually
applied a narrow interpretation.
Although the Eighth Circuit resists judicial review of Munitions List
designations, in United States v. Gregg, it required the highest degree of
knowledge to prove willfulness.106 General knowledge of unlawful conduct
was not enough to find a willful violation. At the time of export, the

specified in administrative regulations).
100. Smith, 918 F.2d at 1033.
101. Id. at 1038.
102. See Hernandez, 662 F.2d at 290.
103. Id. at 292 (internal citation omitted).
104. See Adames, 878 F.2d at 1377.
105. Id. (citing United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (11th Cir. 1983);
Hernandez, 662 F.2d at 292).
106. See United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1437 (8th Cir. 1987).
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defendant must have known that the items were on the Munitions List and
that they required a license for export.107 The Seventh Circuit seems to be
shifting towards this approach. Although the Seventh Circuit did not
require the government to meet as high a burden as the Eighth Circuit
required, the decision in Pulungan indicates that proving general
knowledge of unlawful conduct will not suffice for a criminal violation of
the AECA.
III. United States v. Pulungan: The Seventh Circuit Allows Judicial Review
and Applies a Narrower Definition of “Willfully”
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2007, Doli Pulungan attempted to export 100 Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T
riflescopes through Saudi Arabia to Indonesia.108 These optical sights
attach to both tactical and competitive shooting rifles.109 Pulungan claimed
that he avoided shipping directly to Indonesia because the United States had
imposed an embargo on defense exports to Indonesia.110 Although an
embargo on Indonesia existed between 1999 and 2005, no embargo existed
when Pulungan tried to export the riflescopes.111
The Munitions List includes a category of riflescopes as defense items
requiring a license for export, specifically “riflescopes manufactured to
military specifications.”112 Thus, Pulungan was charged with conspiring to
export defense articles without a license in violation of the AECA.113 At
trial, Pulungan conceded that he attempted to export the riflescopes without
a license, but argued that the riflescopes are not “manufactured to military
specifications.”114 Furthermore, because the regulation in 22 C.F.R. §121.1
does not expressly say, “Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescope,” he refused to
concede that this riflescope fit the Munitions List category.115 Furthermore,
even if the Leupold riflescopes do adhere to military specifications, he
claimed that he did not willfully violate the AECA.116
107. Id.
108. United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d 326, 327 (7th Cir. 2009).
109. See Mark 4 CQ/T Riflescopes, LEUPOLD, http://www.leupold.com/tactical/products/
scopes/mark-4-cqt-riflescopes (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
110. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 327.
111. Id.
112. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)(f) (2009).
113. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 327.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 328.
116. Id. at 327.
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Through testimony from a DDTC official, the government asserted that
the riflescopes fit the Munitions List category.117 While testifying,
however, the official did not disclose the criteria for the designation nor
why the DDTC believes the Leupold riflescopes adhere to military
specifications.118 Rather than require the DDTC official to explain its
reasoning, the trial judge determined, as a matter of law under the AECA,
that the riflescopes were “manufactured to military specifications . . . .” 119
In order to prove that Pulungan acted willfully, the government presented
three pieces of evidence. First, the prosecution presented Pulungan’s
printouts of a website where the riflescopes could be purchased.120 The
website included notifications that the riflescopes could only be shipped to
certain countries, but it did not explain why the destinations were limited.121
Second, the prosecution offered evidence that Pulungan lied to his
suppliers.122 He made inconsistent statements about where he intended to
ship the riflescopes, how willing he was to pay over market-value, and how
many he intended to purchase.123 Finally, the prosecution presented email
messages and notes from Pulungan indicating that he knew he could not
legally ship to Indonesia.124
The jury found Doli Pulungan guilty of conspiring to export defense
articles without a license.125 He was sentenced to forty-eight months in
prison, but he appealed to the Seventh Circuit.126
B. Issues
The Seventh Circuit considered two primary issues on appeal: (1)
whether the DDTC designation of the riflescopes was subject to judicial
review, and (2) whether sufficient evidence showed Pulungan acted
willfully. First, the court addressed whether Pulungan was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury when the district court refused to allow the
jury to question the propriety of the DDTC’s designation of the riflescope
as a defense item.127 Second, the court considered whether the evidence
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 328.
120. Id. at 329.
121. Id. at 330.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 329.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 327.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 328.
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was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pulungan acted
willfully to violate the AECA.128 In reversing the trial court, the Seventh
Circuit held that the government failed to establish that the defendant knew
the riflescopes were designated on the Munitions List and subject to the
licensing requirement.129
IV. Decision of the Case
The Seventh Circuit began by recognizing the benefits of a categorical
Munitions List rather than an enumeration of every possible item.130 A list
identifying attributes of controlled items rather than names avoids the risk
of manufacturers changing names of products in order to bypass
regulations.131 Although a categorical list may prove sensible, the court
applied a strict interpretation of the text of the AECA, exempting only
designations articulated “in regulations” from judicial review.132
Pulungan never contested the DDTC’s authority to include “riflescopes
manufactured to military specifications” in the regulations.133 Congress
clearly granted the President authority to create the categories in the
Munitions List.134 Rather, he argued, and the court agreed, that the DDTC’s
assertion that the Leupold riflescopes fit the category was reviewable.135
Specifically, “Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescope” was not listed under that
category in the Munitions List, so the DDTC designation of these
riflescopes as “defense articles” was subject to review.136
The court explained that allowing the DDTC to designate items without
any known criteria and without the possibility of review would raise serious
constitutional issues.137 The government must prove through more than an
assertion that the items fit the regulations.138 Chief Judge Easterbrook aptly
noted, “A designation by an unnamed official, using unspecified criteria,
that is put in a desk drawer, taken out only for use at a criminal trial, and

128. See id. at 329.
129. Id. at 331.
130. See id. at 328.
131. Id.
132. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h) (2010).
133. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 23, United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d. 326 (7th
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3000).
134. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a).
135. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 328.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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immune from any evaluation by the judiciary, is the sort of tactic usually
associated with totalitarian régimes.”139
Even if the government could have proven the riflescopes are controlled
defense articles, the government could not prove that Pulungan knew they
were on the Munitions List or that he willfully attempted to illegally export
them.140 The government stipulated that the standard “willfully” required
proof that Pulungan knew the riflescopes were on the Munitions List and
that it was illegal to export them without a license.141 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit interpreted “willfully” in the AECA as requiring knowledge of the
ITAR rather than some other regulation.142 This narrow interpretation
departs from the broad definition of “willfully” applied by the Seventh
Circuit in Beck.143
Although the government presented several pieces of evidence, the court
found this evidence insufficient to prove intent to violate the licensing
requirements beyond a reasonable doubt.144 The printouts of websites found
in Pulungan’s possession indicated that the riflescopes could not be
exported outside the U.S. but they did not give a reason for this limitation
or indicate that a license was required.145 Pulungan had no reason to
believe the limitation was due to a DDTC regulation, as the limitation could
have been self-imposed by the manufacturer or distributor.146 In order to
show that Pulungan knew his conduct was unlawful, the government
presented proof that Pulungan lied about how much he was willing to pay
and how many riflescopes he wanted to purchase.147 The government also
presented email messages from Pulungan indicating that he knew exporting
items to Indonesia was illegal.148 The court decided this evidence reflected
Pulungan’s belief in an embargo rather than his knowledge of the license
requirement for defense items.149 His intent to evade a non-existent
embargo did not transfer to a willful intent to violate the AECA by
exporting riflescopes without a license.150
139. Id.
140. Id. at 329.
141. Id. at 331.
142. Id.
143. See United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 1980).
144. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 331.
145. Id. at 330.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 329.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 330.
150. Id. at 330-31.
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V. The Seventh Circuit Reached the Correct Decision in Reviewing the
Ambiguity of DDTC Designations and Applying a Narrow Definition of
Willfulness for an AECA Violation
The ambiguous scope of the ITAR has a stifling effect on U.S.
participation in international trade. The present regulation system increases
the likelihood of unintentional violations by reasonably diligent exporters.
Since Pulungan admittedly tried to avoid U.S. embargo laws,151 he would
likely not be considered a reasonably diligent exporter. Still, his case
reflects the possibility of unintentional violations of U.S. export laws.
Potential exporters are understandably reluctant to engage in business when
the possibility of a product being designated on the Munitions List without
any advanced notice could conceivably lead to a civil penalty or criminal
conviction.
Although national security is an essential consideration for export
controls, expanding trade and preserving procedural due process should
also be considered in export control reforms. The court in Pulungan
correctly recognized the potential for due process violations, allowed
review of DDTC designations of items, and applied a narrow definition of
willfulness for an AECA criminal violation. Chief Judge Easterbrook’s
opinion reflects the need for more transparency in DDTC designations and
pressures the Supreme Court to address the disparity among circuits in
defining willfulness within the AECA.
A. Requiring More Proof Than a DDTC Assertion Alone
The Seventh Circuit expressed obvious discomfort in allowing the
DDTC unfettered authority.152 As a result of the DDTC’s interpretation
that Munitions List designations are exempt from the APA procedures, the
government has previously enjoyed great flexibility in determining and
publicizing designations. The DDTC has consistently made designations
and then claimed that its decisions are immune from judicial review.153
From a legal perspective, this makes it difficult for exporters to challenge
DDTC designations or to know what alterations might be applied to items
to avoid burdensome licensing requirements. The Seventh Circuit rejected
the notion that, as an executive agency, the DDTC can claim its

151. Id. at 327.
152. Id. at 328.
153. See, e.g., id. at 327; United States v. Zheng, 768 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1985); see
also 22 C.F.R. § 128.1 (2010).
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designations are a foreign affairs function and thus have immunity from
judicial review.
The primary problem is that DDTC designations frequently fail to
provide sufficient notice for exporters. For example, the DDTC did not
publicize its decision that Leupold Mark CQ/T riflescopes are covered by
the Munitions List. Pulungan did not ask the DDTC or the manufacturer if
the riflescopes at issue were on the Munitions List, so he lacked sufficient
notice of the designation.154 The court explained that since Pulungan was
not an industry insider, he had no reason to know that he should ask about
the Munitions List.155 As a result of Pulungan’s victory, the Seventh
Circuit pressured the DDTC to be more transparent and proactive regarding
Munitions List designations.
Furthermore, Pulungan reduced the responsibility for an exporter to
utilize commodity jurisdiction requests to determine whether goods are
export-controlled by the Department of State. The ITAR provides a method
If
for Munitions List inquiries through commodity jurisdiction.156
manufacturers or exporters are unsure whether an item is covered by the
Munitions List, commodity jurisdiction allows the manufacturer to request
a decision by the DDTC.157 Commodity jurisdiction, however, is only
helpful if the exporter knows that it is available. Pulungan may reduce the
impact of commodity jurisdiction procedures and weaken the government’s
ability to prove knowledge of the regulations. Without compelling
individuals to inquire into Munitions List designations prior to export, the
Seventh Circuit ruling makes it more difficult for the government to prove
knowledge of the law.
In order to avoid similar, unfavorable decisions, the DDTC should
change its method of disseminating information. Unless Munitions List
designations and criteria are proactively publicized, the DDTC will likely
face more challenges when items do not clearly fit Munitions List
categories, and DDTC designations will be more susceptible to judicial
review. The Pulungan decision rejects the notion that an executive agency
can assume that whatever it asserts is conclusive and unreviewable.
B. Applying a Narrower Definition of “Willfully”
The circuit courts have attempted to outline what the government must
prove to show an intentional violation of the AECA, but the inconsistency
154. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 329.
155. Id.
156. 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(a).
157. See id.
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across circuits has only complicated matters. Pulungan adds to this
inconsistency and requires more evidence from the government to prove a
willful violation of the AECA. Unlike some circuits, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that a mistaken belief that conduct is unlawful falls short of proving
an intentional violation of the licensing requirement.158 The Pulungan court
stressed that willfulness in a regulatory offense requires knowledge of “this
rule,” referring to the Munitions List in the ITAR, rather than knowledge of
any other potential regulation.159 Since the DDTC designation of the
riflescopes as export-controlled was unknown to the general public until
Pulungan’s trial, the government could not prove that Pulungan knew of the
regulation before he violated it.160
The Seventh Circuit decision bolsters circuit courts that have applied a
narrow definition of willfulness, requiring more than mere knowledge of
unlawful conduct.161 The circuit split is decidedly more pronounced with
the addition of the Seventh Circuit applying a narrower definition of
“willfully,” along with the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.
C. Using Pulungan as Persuasive Authority in Other Federal Circuits
The Pulungan decision has been utilized in subsequent arguments by
defendants claiming that the government cannot prove an intentional
violation of the AECA. In Pennsylvania, a man who was sentenced to
thirty-two months in prison for unlawfully exporting the same riflescopes as
Pulungan, filed a motion to vacate his sentence due to ineffective
counsel.162 Citing Pulungan, the movant claimed that his counsel failed to
advise him that he could not be found guilty if he had no knowledge of the
licensing requirement.163 The movant maintained that he pled guilty with
the understanding that his lack of knowledge of the licensing requirement
was irrelevant in his case.164
In the Sixth Circuit, a retired professor from the University of Tennessee
(UT), who is now infamous in the export control realm, utilized Pulungan

158. Pulungan, 569 F.3d at 330.
159. Id. at 331.
160. Id. at 329.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Adames, 878 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1981) (applying a narrow interpretation of “willfully”).
162. Motion to Vacate at 1, 4, United States v. Komoroski, No. 3:08-cr-00228-EMK
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010).
163. Id. at 18-19.
164. Id. at 23.
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in his appeal.165 Professor Roth was convicted of violating the AECA by
Roth
unlawfully exporting technical data and defense services.166
transported a laptop containing controlled technical data to the People’s
Republic of China and allowed two foreign national UT graduate students
access to the data and a controlled research item.167 Both the data and the
research item, a Force Stand designed to collect data, involved plasma
technology for use on aircrafts.168 This seemingly innocent activity,
traveling with a laptop and collaborating with graduate students, sounded
alarms in university legal counsel offices across the country. On appeal,
Roth’s counsel cited Pulungan as persuasive authority to show that the jury
instructions should have required that the defendant knew the items are on
the Munitions List.169
Notably, instead of relying on a DDTC assertion that the items are
controlled as it did in Pulungan, the government introduced evidence
detailing why the items fit the category of defense articles on the Munitions
List. This reveals the government’s recognition that it can no longer rely on
the notion that DDTC decisions are unreviewable. Citing Pulungan, the
Sixth Circuit allowed judicial review of the DDTC determination that the
technical data and Force Stand fit the category on the Munitions List.170
Because the items were intended for military use, the court found the
DDTC determination valid.171 The court opted for the broader definition of
willfulness, only requiring knowledge that conduct was unlawful, and
upheld Roth’s conviction.172
In the First Circuit, which has previously applied a broad definition of
willfulness for AECA violations, a district court declined to adopt the
Pulungan knowledge requirement,173 but the court did entertain a vagueness
challenge to the ITAR similar to Pulungan’s challenge.174 In United States

165. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 23, United States v. Roth, 642 F. Supp.
2d 796 (E.D. Tenn. 2009) (No. 3:08-CR-69), aff’d, 628 F.3d 827 (6th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter
Reply Brief].
166. Roth, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
167. Brief of the United States at 2, Roth, 642 F. Supp. 2d 796 (No. 3:08-CR-69).
168. United States v. Roth, 628 F.3d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 2011).
169. Reply Brief, supra note 165, at 23.
170. Roth, 628 F.3d at 832.
171. Id. at 833.
172. Id. at 835.
173. See United States v. Wu, 680 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 (D. Mass. 2009).
174. See United States v. Wu, No. 08-10386-PBS, 2011 WL 31345, slip op. at *1 (D.
Mass. Jan. 4, 2011).
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v. Wu, the jury convicted the defendants of violating the AECA.175 The
defendants sought to vacate the verdict on the grounds that the regulations
lacked sufficient notice and that the post-export application of the ITAR
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.176 In an as-applied
challenge to the AECA for vagueness, the judge emphasized that when the
military purpose of the items is not obvious, if the defendant was told or
aware that the items at issue are controlled defense articles or services, then
the regulations are not vague as-applied.177 The court granted the motions
to set aside two counts of violating the AECA because the defendants only
had notice that those particular items might be subject to the EAR, but not
the ITAR.178 The court reasoned:
While evidence of willfulness is closely related to due process
issues in the case law, due process is not necessarily satisfied if a
defendant has fair notice that a license may be required under
one law, but is charged under another law that he had no notice
he was violating.179
The lack of sufficient notice, coupled with agency disagreement as to
whether the EAR or ITAR governed the items, led to the court decision that
Counts 2 and 3 violated both the Due Process Clause and the Ex Post Facto
Clause.180 As in Pulungan, the DDTC’s delayed designation made it
difficult to prove the defendants’ knowledge.
Unpredictability in agency designations exemplifies the need for export
control reforms that include increased transparency and judicial review.
Otherwise, the U.S. risks losing its economic edge in aviation and defense
industries due to a crippling export control system.
VI. Conclusion
As part of President Obama’s export control reforms, the President
created the Federal Export Enforcement Coordination Center to minimize
enforcement agency conflicts.181 The most significant change is the
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *6.
178. Id. at *10.
179. Id. at *11.
180. Id. at *12.
181. See Press Release, Office of Press Secretary, Executive Order – Export Coordination
Enforcement Center (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/
2010/11/09/executive-order-export-coordination-enforcement-center [hereinafter November
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transition to a positive Munitions List. If a positive list had existed prior to
Pulungan’s attempted export, he would not have been able to make the
argument that the Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescopes did not fit the category
of “[r]iflescopes manufactured to military specifications.”182 This change
will assist the DDTC because the agency will no longer falter by relying
solely on an assertion to prove the item is controlled. Instead, the item will
be clearly included on the Munitions List.
The President also indicated that the major control lists, the CCL and
Munitions List, could potentially be consolidated.183 This consolidation
could reduce confusion and jurisdictional disputes between agencies,
eliminating the possibility of exporters inadvertently checking the wrong
list.
The inconsistent definitions of “willfully” in the AECA will still exist
despite these sweeping reforms. Without an amendment of the AECA, the
mens rea requirement and penalties will remain the same, even with a
positive Munitions List. Although the reforms will make it easier for the
government to prove willfulness, what evidence will be required is still
open for debate.
The transition to a positive Munitions List will be gradual and subject to
controversy. In the meantime, some circuit courts will allow judicial
review of DDTC designations, while other circuits will defer to the agency
as a matter of law. The unpublished Munitions List designations will
continue to risk ensnaring innocent individuals. Consequently, newcomers
to aviation and defense industries within the region should familiarize
themselves with these changing regulations. Until Congress or the
Supreme Court addresses the present circuit split, the ambiguous
regulations will potentially stifle the export of goods, reducing the
involvement of American companies in the global economy.
Cody Jones

Press Release].
182. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)(f) (2010).
183. November Press Release, supra note 181.

